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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - ~ - -
MATTHEW C. HARRIS 
and GARY S. HARRIS, 
vs. 
Plaintif;f.s-
Appellan ts, 
THE UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
and LESTER LORENZO LOOSEMORE, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
No. 17042 
- - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - -
RESPONDENTSt BRIEF 
- - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - -
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This- is an action·brought by plaintiffs for personal 
injuries sustained as a result of a collision between a 
jeep in which Matthew Harris was a passenger and a Utah 
Transit Authority bus. 
DISP0SrTI:ON l:N THE LOWER COURT 
A jury trial was commenced in the Second· Judicial District 
Court of Weber County with the H.onorable Ronald O" Hyde pre-
siding. The jury returned a special verdict form in favor 
·<'9 
of defendants and agains-t plainti.ffs o A judgment was 
accordingly entered finding no cause of action against 
defendants. Plaintifts •· motion for a new trial was sub-
sequently denied by the lower court. 
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.RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court jud~ent 
entered pursuant to the jury verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants have raised several issues in this appeal 
including their claim that the trial court erred in finding 
th.e jeel? driver negligent as a matter of law and in failing 
to find the nus driver negligent as a matter of law. 
Because both. of these claims necessarily involve an extensive 1 
review of the record, it would serve no purpose to review 
in great detail the facts at this juncture. However, a 
brief overview of the. accident and the trial may oe helpful 
to this Court. 
On March 7, 1977, the plaintiff Matthew H:arris was riding I 
in the passenger seat of a jeep driven by Rodney c. Talbot. 
I 
(Tr. 5471. Another hoy, Kevin Della Lucia, was riding in 
the middle of the jeep in a special box designed for jeeps 
equipped with bucket seats. (Tr. 554}. The boys were on 
an errand for their teacher at Weber High in Ogden and were 
en route to Bonneville High. to deliver some papers. (Tr. 
546) • The jeep was proceeding south on W'ashlngton Boule-
vard. The weatherwas dry and clear. (Tr. 548) • 
Meanwhile, defendant Lester Loosemore was proceeding 
on h.is assigned ~r:oute with the Utah Transi.t Authority. 
The route basically encompassed all of washington Boulevard. 
(Tr. 609t. Mr. Loosemore n.ad already made two trips that 
-2 .... 
Ir 
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morning and was proceedi~~ south on Washington Boulevard 
on his third trip. (Tr. 613). 
At approximately 1700 North and Washington Boulevard 
Mr. Loosemore saw a passenger waiting near a mailbox and 
bus stop. (Tr. 621). The area in which the passenger was 
standing had no curb and there was no designated stopping 
area. (Tr. 623). It is undisputed that the bus made a 
gradual and normal pullove.r in order to pick up the waiting 
passenger. (Tr. 64 O, 686, 663)_. The evidence adduced at 
trial was consistent in showing that the bus had stopped 
at the time of the accident, although the length of such 
stop varied from witness to witness .. 
At the place of the accident Washington Boulevard is 
42 feet wide from the edge of the as.phalt to the edge of 
the asphalt. (Tr .. 513}. There are two lanes in both the 
northbound and southbound directione (Plaintiff's Exhibits 
3-16). The bus was parked so that its left side was en-
croaching in approximately half of the outside traffic 
southbound lane. (Tr. 528}. There was, therefore, 
approximately 15 feet of unobstructed s·outhbound lanes 
still remaini~g. (Tro 533}. Although the bus driver 
stated that he felt unsafe in pulling off the road any 
further, the shoulder to the right of the bus was 
physically large enough to accommodate the entire bus. 
(Tr. 622, 625). 
It was undisputed that the bus was approximately 10 feet 
wide and 12 feet hi.gh. (Tr. 647}_. The bus is equipped with Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
four large rear lights· which are activated by the brake, 
turn signals, and flashers. (Tr. 7031. 
It is als·o undisputed that Washington Boulevard at the 
point of the accident is straight with no curves. This 
straightaway extends hack approximately two miles from the 
site of the accident. (Tr, 761}. The speed limit on 
Washington Boulevard in this section of the highway is 50 
miles an hour. 
Wh_ile there wa,S some dispute as to the exact speed the 
jeep was: traveling,. it was generally- assumed by the various 
experts that it was traveling at a speed of approximately 
50 miles an hour when the collision_ occurred. The driver 
of the jeep testified that he did not recall seeing the bus 
until some 10 to 50. feet prior to hitting it. (Tr. 562}. 
The driver- swerved to the le;ft and glancingly struck the 
left portion of the rear of the bus. The jeep then proceede 
to the side of the hus where it stopped. (Tr. 5501. The 
plaintiff Matthew HaI:"ris was caught in between the jeep and 
th.e :Ous and pulled trom the jeep onto the pavement. (Tr. 
551). 
The trial of this matter was commenced on December 4, 
1979, and continued for three additional days. Extensive 
evidence was presented by both sides as to the circumstances 
and probable causes of th.is accident. The-plaintiff called 
Police Chief Earl ~- CaI:"roll who arrived at the scene and 
took extensive. pictures of the accident. (Tr. 494-5061, 
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Officer Rex Cragun of the Riverdale City Police Depart-
ment also testified on behalf of plaintiff as to the 
physical measurements- and investigation he conducted. 
(Tr. 507-533). Sgt. Charles Beaman of the North Ogden 
City Police Department related his observations at 
the time of the accident and his subsequent visit to 
the scene for accident reconstruction4 (Tr . 5 3 4 .. 5 4 4) • 
Plaintiff called the driver of the jeep; Rodney 
Carl Talbot,who described his version of how the accident 
occurred. (Tr. 546-565}. In addition, the passenger of the 
jeep Kevin Dela Lucia gave his- recollection as to the 
circumstances of the accident. (Tr. 566-574). Helen 
Hollingshead, Robert Preston, and Gloria Myers were all 
driving separate vehicles behind the jeep and were also 
called by plaintiff to describe their various observations. 
(Tr. 575-600t., 
Plaintiff examined various· employees aTl..d former employees 
of defendant Utah Transit Authority. The bus driver-defendant 
Lester LoosemQre was examined as to his memory of the events 
occurring on the day of the accident. fTr. 600-649.l. 
Russell Simonsen, a supe.rvisor of the defendant, was interro-
gated as to his observations when he arrived at the accident 
siteo (Tr. 650-656). Finally, Daniel Newland, defendant's 
shop foreman, was examined as to various mechanical aspects 
of plaintiffs' case, including their claim that the rear 
lights of the bus were not functioning correctlyo (Tr. 
689-717). 
~s-
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Plaintiffs als<> called Rex Child and Barbara Warner who 
were passengers on the bus at the time of the accident and 
who testified as to their recall of the accident. (Tr. 
657-664 i 686-688) • 
The plaintiff, Matthew Ha~rris, testified as to his 
limited memory of the day of the accident and as to the 
damages he incurred because of the accident. (Tr. 665-686). 
Finally, plaintiffs called Robert Quinn as an expert witness 
to recreate plaintiffs' version of the circumstances sur-
rounding the accident including plaintiffs•- theory that the 
defendant driver was negligent in the location of the vehicle 
and in the maintenance of the bus. _(Tr. 717-751}. 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs•· case defendants moved 
for a directed verdi.ct against th.e plaintiffs on the grounds 
that plaintiffs did not show- that the actions of defendants 
were the proximate cause of Mr. Harris' injuries. After 
extensive argument the lower court denied defendants' motion. 
(Tr. 752-7611. 
Defendants called Diane Child and Linda Mark who were both[ 
passengers in the bus on the day of the accident. (Tr. 761-
768; 8Q6-808). In addition, defendants called Trina Farr; 
who observed the jeep as it was being driven down washington 
Boulevard just prior to th_e accident... (Tr. 809_-815). 
Finally, defendants called their own reconstruction 
expert, Professor Rudolph Limpert, who related ·that in his 
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opinion the cause of the accident was the failure of the 
jeep driver to pay proper attention to the road in front 
of him. (Tr. 7 6 8- 8 0 6) . 
Both plaintiff and defendants moved for a directed 
verdict at the conclusion of the case and both motions were 
denied by the trial court. (Tr. 816..-8171. The matter was 
submitted to the jury on special verdict after instructions 
by the court. Th.e verdict returned by the jury found the 
defendants not negligent in either the maintenance of the 
bus or in the bus's ope:ration. (Tr. 235}. A judgment was 
entered in accordance with the special verdict form. (Tr. 
405-406). 
Plaintiffs moved for a new trial and a hearing was held 
on March 14, 1980, at which time the lower court denied 
plaintiffs' requesto (Tr. 407, 475, 476)0 Plaintiffs 
appeal from the judgment entered by the. lower court and 
from the order denying new- trial.. (Tr. 4 77) o 
ARGUMENT 
l?O:LNT I 
THE TRI:AL COURT WAS CORRECT IN INSTI:WCTING THE 
J·URY- THAT RODNEY' TALBOT WAS NE"GLI:GENT. 
As noted previously, the lower court declined to direct 
a verdict in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiffs~ At .th_e conclusion of the trial the lower court 
did, however, instruct the jury '"that the driver of the 
jeep, Rodney Tal:Oot, was negligent as a matter of :1aw." 
(Tr. 253). Appellant complains that the trial court 
..., 
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committed· error i.n making this. determination. (Appellants' 
brief, pp. 4 ..... a1.. Tni.s· argument is without merit, 
Rodney Talbot was not a party in this lawsuit. Because 
of the "guest statute ... , plain.tiff was unable to sue Mr. Talbot 
for his injuries. Likewise, def.endants were unable to 
bring any third party complaint against Mr. Talbot since 
to do so would circumvent the guest statute. :Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad v. Dewayne Construction Company, 
552 P. 2d 117 (Utah 19.76). Defendants did maintain, however, 
that the conduct of Mr. Talbot was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident and, therefore, even if the bus driver 
Loosemore had be.en negligent his negligence did not cause 
the accident. 
The lower court instructed the jury that Mr. Talbot was 
negligent as a matter of law in the operation of the jeep. 
He did not, however, instruct the jury that Talbot's conduct 
was the proximate cause of the accident, The question of 
proximate cause was left to the jury to decide as stated 
in Instruction 14 given by the Court. (Tr. 2531. Similarly,[ 
the Court did not ins.truct the jury as to the negligence of 
bus driver or th_e proximate cause of his conduct. This too 
was left for a jury determination. 
'I'hus, the only is:s·ue. which was decided as a matter of law 
by the Court was th.at ot the. negligence of the jeep driver. 
A review of the record most favorabl·e to plaintiffs clearly 
shows that the Court was· correct in this ruling in that 
reasonable minds could not differ~~ ~~-~~--
negligent. 
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Plaintiffs called Rodney Carl Talbot as a witness. 
Mr. Talbot was extremely candid and truth in his answers, 
both on direct examination and cross-examination. He 
stated that on the day of the accident he arrived at 
Weber High_ School and was asked by one of his teachers 
to deliver papers to Bonneville High School. (Tr. 54 6) . 
At that time.he conferred with both Matthew Harris and 
Kevin Lucia and it.was decided that they should also 
accompany him on the trip after they obtained permission 
from their teacher. (Tr. 547). 
Mr. Talbot testified t:nat his jeep was in excellent 
condition and that the :Drakes h.ad been completely redone. 
Upon leaving the school, Mr. Talbot di:o"'le, Matthew Harris 
was in the passenger seat, and Kevin Lucia was. in a specially 
designed box between the two seatso (Tr. 547, 554) .. 
Mr. Talbot stated that the weather was dry and clear as 
he proceeded south on Washington Boulevard. (Tr. 548) . 
He stated he was proceeding between 40 and 50 miles an 
hour with the normal flow of traffic. (Tr. 549) . He had 
traveled approximately a mile in the right inside lane 
before the accident occurredo (Trp 54~I. 
On dir~ct examination he stated that there came a 
time when he:.:suddenly saw the bus in front of him.. He said 
he looked up, saw the bus and glanced in his mirror to the 
left to make sure the left lane was clear,. and then began 
..-.9' .... 
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to turn and brake to go around the bus. The jeep grazed 
the left side of the stopped bus and finally halted in fron1 
of the bus. (Tr. 550). 
Counsel for defendants on cross-examination extensively
1 
examined Mr. Talbot as to the details concerning his testiJ 
on direct. He stated, for example, that the visibility on 
that day was good. (Tr. 553). He could not recall what the 
three boys were doing prior to the accident although he 
stated that they could have been talking among themselves. 
(Tr. 555). 
Defendants' counsel then engaged in the following 
dialogue with Mr. Talbot. 
Q Now you indicated on direct examination 
that you looked up and saw the bus ahead 
of you? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q Was your attention directed to the floor? 
I don't understand. Did you actually 
physically look up and see the bus? 
A I don't know where my attention was. I 
did just look up or look. 
Q But your attention was not directed to the 
front of your vehicle, though; was it? 
I mean, you weren't looking out the window 
and seeing what was in front of you, were 
you? 
A Not at that second, I must not have been. 
Q So you didn't see the bus the second before 
though, did you? You didn't see the bus at 
any time until you swerved to miss it, did 
you? 
A I may have seen it be= 
w 
I 
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Q You're indicating to me that you saw the 
bus a number of -- hundreds of yards in 
front of you, and then continued to drive 
toward it, though? 
A No, I'm saying I may have seen it before, 
but I don't recall seeing it before. 
Q The first time you recalled seeing the bus 
on this occasion, though, was when you 
looked up and saw it there in front of 
you, and you swerved to try to miss it? 
A That's the first time I remember seeing 
it. 
Q Okay. No other times prior to that few 
moments prior to the accident did you recall 
seeing the bus? 
A I don 1 t remember seeing it. 
(Emphasis added) ., 
(Tr. 558-559). 
Subsequent to this dialogue additional testimony was given 
by the witenss which also illustrates the correctness of the 
lower court r· s ruling .. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
You werentt paying any attention as to whether 
the bus was moving? 
I couldn •· t tell if it was stopped or stopping 
when I hit it -- when I seen it. 
So it could have been either one? 
Right. 
All right.. ,And prior to the time. that you 
glanced up and saw this bus and made these 
maneuvers to avoid the rear end of the bus, 
you didn't know what the bus was doing, do 
you? I mean, you didn't see it slow down 
and stop, or you didn't see the passengers 
that they were picking up there; did you? 
No. 
So you don't know whether the bus stopped 
gradually or whether it stopped quickly, or 
what, because you didn •· t s·ee it? It's 
true, you didn •· t see the bus prior to the 
time you glanced up that you recall? Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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A No. 
Q And you can give us no estimate in car 
lengths· or anything how far you were away 
when you first saw that bus? 
A I would just be a gues-s. I '.COuldn •- t give 
you an exact answer. 
Q You can't give us any type of a reasonable 
estimate? 
A It would be just a guess, anywhere from 
10 to 50 feet. It would be a guess. 
Q You didntt have any trouble seeing the 
bus as you looked up and ·saw it, did you? 
A No. 
Q It was right th.ere as big as life, wasn't it? 
A Right. 
* * * 
Q When you looked up and saw th.is bus, there 
as big as life as we discussed, you didn't 
really make any observations-, any detailed 
observation, of the rear of the bus other 
tnan to s-ee th.at it was there and then 
decide that you had to do something or else 
you were going to run into the back of iti 
isn't that true? You didn"t make any 
detailed observation of the color. You 
already told us you don"t know what color 
it was. You didn't make any detailed 
observation of the light, did you? 
A No. I just seen the bus- and tried to 
avoid it. 
* * * 
Q I guess the thing is, Rod, would it be fair 
to say th_at for s·ome reason you just didn • t 
see the. bus until you were too close to miss 
it, and.i:is'? you collided with the bus, is 
that a. ~a~r statement? 
.,...12-
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A Yes. (Tr. 56 5) . (Emphasis added) . 
Likewise, Kevin Lucia, the other passenger in the jeep, 
stated that he did not see the bus until some 30 or 40 feet 
from the back of the bus. At that time he stated he knew 
the bus was stopped and had no difficulty in seeing it 
since visability was good that day. He also could not 
recall where he was looking prior to seeing the bus. 
(Tr. 5 71-57 3) . 
Regardless· of the question of proximate causation, it 
cannot be doubted that the driver of the jeep was negligent 
as a matter of law in failing to see a stopped bus which 
was 10 feet wide and 12 feet high on a clear dry morning 
with no obstacles in front of the jeep and with a two 
mile straightaway '::_:>receding. the location of the bus. 
Obviously, for whatever reason, the occupants in the jeep 
were preoccupied with some activity for a considerable 
length of time since the driver of the jeep did not recall 
ever seeing the bus in front of him prior to impact. 
Defendants argued that the question of proximate cause 
was also clear in that the driver of the jeep caused the 
accident. The trial court, however, rejected this argument 
and submitted the question of proximate causation to the 
jury, even though this Court on previous occasions has 
affirmed a lower court'"s holding, as. a matter of law, 
to both the issue of negligence and proximate cause in 
factual situations similar to the instant case. 
-13-
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In Valasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Itic. , 3 6 6 P. 2d 9 8 9 
(Utah 19611 this Court affirmed a lower court"s judgment 
n.o.v. in favor of a stopped truck where a Greyound bus 
ran into t.he truck on a clear night with no obstacles in 
the way. 
Likewise, in Anderson v. Parsons Red-E-Mix Paving 
Company, 467 P.2d 45 (Ut~ 1970), this Court affirmed a 
lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as a 
matter of law on the basis that the plaintiff's conduct 
in running into a parked Red-E-Mix truck was both 
negligent and was the proximate cause of the accident. 
As this Court stated: 
In the instant case th.e collision occurred in 
the middle of the afternoon in broad daylight 
on a clear day; and there was nothing either 
to obstruct the vision or distract the 
attention of the host driver Kim Mortenson 
betwee.n Main Street and this large Red-E-Mix 
truck standing th.ere "·as big as life and 
twice as· natural"· on the street. Id. at 47. 
In the instant case, Mr. Talbot also testified that the bus 
was "there as big as life" and was standing there "like a 
sore thumb." (Tr. 562, 565}. Certainly, the testimony of 
the driver and the passenger of the jeep clearly establish 
as a matter of law that the driver negligently failed 
to maintain a proper lookout for hazards in front of him 
and the lower court was correct in so instructing the 
jury. 
:Plaintiffs' arguments as to the operation of the tail .... 
lights and the location of the bus do not affect a fi..nding 
_,JI_ Ii 
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of negligence on the part of the jeep driver. Even if it 
is assumed arguendo that the lights on the bus were not 
working properly and that the bus had been negligently 
parked in the right inside lane, this would still not 
eliminate a finding of negligence on the part of the jeep 
driver in failing to observe the stopped vehicle. 
The negligence O·f the bus driver and the maintenance of 
the vehicle goes solely to the question of proximate 
causation. This issue, however, was submitted to the 
jury for their determination. 
Even plaintiffs' counsel in arguing against a motion 
for directed verdict acknowledged that the driver of the 
jeep may have been negligent in not observing the situation 
but was still entitled to a jury question as to proximate 
causation. (Tr. 758-759). The trial court refused to 
grant defendants' motion for directed verdict and instead 
submitted the question of proximate causation to the 
jury.. eased upon the evidence, plaintiffs were entitled 
to no more th.an this opportunity and arguably were not 
entitled to any opportunity before a juryG 
Finally, the Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines case, 
cited by appellants, is not contrary to the position of 
defendants. (Appellants' brief, p. 8}9 In that case, 
a- factual issue existed as to the proximate causation of 
the accident. In addition, there was obvious1y no clear 
evidence that the automobile following the bus was negligent 
as a.matter of law. For this reason both the question 
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of negligence and proximate causation were submitted to 
the jury. Even in that case, however, Justice Crockett in 
a dissent stated that he could see no conduct on the 
part of the bus which proximately caused the injury since 
the driver drove into the rear of the bus in broad daylight 
and was therefore the sole proximate cause of the collision. 
414 P .. 2d at 89. 
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in instruc 
ing the jury that the jeep driver was negligent as a matter I 
of law. 
POINT r:r. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY SUBMITTED THE ISSUE OF 
DEFENDANT LOOSEMORE'S NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. 
Appellant argues that the evidence of Loosemore's 
negligence was at least as strong as Talbotts and that 
therefore. the Court sltould have also ruled Loosemore negligen, 
(Appellantst brief, p. 9). 
A review of the issues presented at trial together with 
the evidence adduced at trial shows that appellantst claim 
lacks any validity. 
Plaintiffs asserted that Loosemore or defendant UTA was 
negligent in three respects. First, that Loosemore violated 
Section 41-6-101, U.C.A., relating to parking on a highway; 
second, that the lights of the bus were not functioning 
correctly and therefore failed to warn the jeep driver; 
and third, Loosemore failed to keep a proper lookout. 
None of these contentions, however, were und-i ~rm-+- able 
as was the negligence of the jeep-
ti 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the conflicting evidence clearly shows this. 
Section 41-6-101, U.C.A., provides that no person 
should park or leave a vehicle on a paved or traveled 
highway if it is ''practical to stop, park, or to leave 
such vehicle off such part of said highway .. " The 
statute then continues th.at in any event an unobstructed 
width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle 
shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles 
and a clear view of such stopped vehicle must be available 
from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon the 
highway. 
As noted earlier, the total width of the road from 
asphalt to asphalt was 42 feet. (Tr. 5131. The bus 
was partially on the shoulder of the road and partially 
on the lane adjoining the road" There still remained 
15 feet of unobstructed southbound lanes· available to 
passing motorists.. The vis·ihili ty of the bus was clearly 
in excess of 20Q feet in each direction and, in fact, 
was several miles. 
While plaintiffs maintained there was no reason for the 
bus driver to fai.l to pull en ti.rely over to the. shoulder 
of the highway, Mr. Loosemore testified that YE. felt unsafe 
in pulling any further into such area because of a large 
ditch.which adjoined the shoulder of the road. (Tr. 623-
624). He stated furth.er that it would have been unsafe 
for him to have gone any closer towards the awaiting 
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passenger since he would have had to drive directly toward 
her rather than pulli~g up to the side of her. (Tr. 
644-645}. 
Loosemore further testified that upon seeing the passenge 
some 300 or 400 feet 6ack on the road that he activated 
his right turn signal and maintained the signal while he 
was stopped. (Tr. 640-·641}. He stated further that during 
the stop h_e kept his foot on the brake which would 
activate the rear brake lights as well as the turn signal 
light which was already on. (Tr • 6 4 0-6 41) • 
Thus, there was first a jury question as to whether the 
statute itself was violated. The jury certainly could have 
believed that it was, under the circumstances, "impractical" 
to pull over any further on the shoulder of the road in light 
of the position of the passengers. 
In any event, even if the driver was guilty of violating 
the parking statute such violation is still only prima ~ 
evidence of negligence and is subject to justification or 
excuse. In Intermountain Farmers Association v. Fitzgerald, ( 
574 P~2d 1162 (Utah 1978), it was said: 
This court has long held that the violation 
of a statute does not necessarily con-
stitute negligence per se and may be 
considered only as evidence of negligence • • • . 
This rule. was estaolished in Thompson v. Ford Motor Compan11 
39.5 P.2d 62 (Utah 1964} where this Court stated that the 
violation of a safety standard is subject to justification 
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or excuse if the evidence is such that it reasonably could 
be found that th.e conduct was nevertheless within the 
standard of reas·onable care under the circumstances. 
Thus, the jury was clearly presented with two factual 
issues on this first contention alone: first, was the 
statute violation; second, if so, was the conduct of the 
defendant nevertheless reasonable. The Court could not 
rule defendantts conduct in parking to be negligence as a 
matter of law. 
Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants were negligent 
in the maintenance of the bus in th.at the rear lights 
improperly functioned. Again, the.re was conflicting 
evidence as to the operability of these lights which 
clearly presented a jury question. 
Plaintiffs calle.d·several witnesses who stated they 
could not recall seeing the lights either preceding or sub-
sequent to the accident. Defendants, on the other hand, 
produced several other witnesses who stated the contrary. 
Exhibits 7, 8 and 5 show· lights on the bus immediately 
following the accident.. Sgt. Charles Beaman testified that 
he recalled seeing flashing lights on the bus when he 
arrived at the scene. CTr. 543}. Mr. Loosemore testified 
that the lights on the dashboard indicate each time a turn 
signal and a brake light is working and if the lights on the 
dashboard do not come on it indicates that the outside 
lights· are not functioning. (Tr. 635). At the time of the 
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operating. (Tr. 640-641). 
Mr. Russe.11 Simonsen, a supervisor of UTA, stated that 
when he arrive.a some 10 minutes- after the accident he 
observe.d the front hazard lights flashi.ng and the rear 
right side. hazard ligh_t flashing. The left light had 
been damage.d in the accident.. (Tr. 650-654}. Mr. Daniel 
Newland, the shop foreman of UTA, stated that it would not 
be possible for the panel lights of the bus to come on if 
the outside lights were not functioning. (Tr. 7071. 
Diane Child testified that as she was sitting on the 
bus at the time of the accident she heard the clicking 
of the s·ignal light inside the bus just shortly prior to 
the collision. (Tr. 765}. Finally, Linda Mark testified 
that s-h.e had been picked up by the :0.us just prior to 
the accident and that she directly passed the back of the 
bus at such time and saw bo~h the brake lights and the 
turn signal light functioning. (Tr. 806-8081. 
The preceding is illustrative of the conflicting testimon 
which existed at the trial. Concededly, plaintiffs pro-
duced witnesses who stated the lights were not functioning 
at the time of the accident, attempted to show that an 
intermittent short was present in the system which could 
not be no:r:mally detected, and otherwise attempted to impea~ 
all of the witnesses previously listed. Nevertheless, the 
credibility of this evidence was a question for the jury 
to decide. 
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should never have been submitted to the jury since Mr. 
Talbot clearly stated on cross-examination that he 
had not seen the bus prior to the time it was immediately 
in front of him and that he had no difficulty in realizing 
it was stopped. (Tr. 562}. Defendants contended therefore 
that even if the company was negligent in the maintenance 
of the lights that, as a matter of law, there was no 
proximate causation between the lights and the actions of 
the jeep driver. 
This contention is borne out in- Jilka v., National Mutual 
Casualty Company of Tulsa, 106 P.2d 665 (Kan. 1940), where it 
was stated that where the abs.ence of lights or warning 
signals do not prevent motorists from seeing a vehicle 
in time to avoid colliding with it, their absence is not 
the proximate cause of the resulting collisiono Like•ise, 
in Stoddard v. Nelson, 581 P.2d 339 (Ida. 1978), the court 
stated that the failure to have operating headlights on a 
motor vehicle does not create liability unless the absence 
of such lights is a proximate cause of the collision. 
Finally, this Court in Valasquez v. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 366 P.2d 989 (Utah 19-611, discussed an argument raised 
by a defendant that a truckdriver had failed to put out 
warning flares in back of his stopped vehicle. In rejecting 
such argument, this Court stated, ~'If there had been flares 
out, or even if the. truck had been aflame, it could have 
given him no more information. •1c Id. at 9_90. 
-21-
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Similarly, in this case the presence of warning 
ligh.ts, a flagmelin, or any- other attention .... getting device 
would h.ave had no effect upon the actions of the jeep 
driver since he- only saw the bus for th.e first time 
when he was almost on top of it. rn any event, however, 
the Court did submit Both the issue of negligence and 
proximate cause to the jury as to the maintenance of the 
equipment. 
Plaintiffs-•· third contention was that since the bus 
driver failed to recall seeing tiie jeep in his mirror as 
he pulled over he was guilty of maintaining an improper 
lookout as a matter of law. Negligence is defined as a 
breach of a duty to use due care under the circumstances 
of a situation. Wheeler v. i:J'o"nes, 431 P. 2d 986 (Utah 1967)_. 
Mr. Loosemore testified at trial that before pulling over 
to the side of the road to pick up the passenger he looked 
in his mirrors and recalled s-eeing a white stationwagon. 
He stated that he was sure there were other vehicles 
behind it but did not pay any attention to them. (Tr. 639). 
While the length of time that the bus stopped was 
contested by the plaintiff, tnere was no doubt that the bus 
was stopped. The time varied from a minimum of one second 
to a maximum of over 10 seconds. rt was also undisputed 
that the stop made by the bus driver was gradual and smooth 
and was in no way abrupt or s-udden. Certainly, it could 
not be said as a matter of law that the failure of the bus 
driver to look into the mirror while the bus was stopped 
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or inunediately preceding such stop could have, as a 
matter of law, been ne9li9ence on his part when it was 
disputed whether the jeep would even have :Deen in the 
inunediate range of the mirror when the s·top was made. 
Plaintiffs were permitted to argue this alleged act 
of negligence to the jury as cons-tituting negligent conduct 
on the part of the ous driver. Once again, defendants 
contended that, as a matter of law, even if the driver 
was negligent in failing to observe. the approaching jeep, 
such negligence would not be a proximate cause of the 
accident.. The trial court, nevertheless, submitted both 
issues to the jury and the jury found against the plaintiffs. 
It is therefore obvious that the alleged negligence of 
the defendant bus driver or the UTA was either a matter of 
fact for the jury to determine or, as- a matter of law, 
should never have been submitted to the jury in the first 
place because of the. ;ea!.lure. to sh.ow any proximate cause 
which could have resulted even from proven negligence .. 
Nevertheless-, the lower court gave plaintiffs every 
opportunity to argue and prove all elements of defendantst 
alleged negligence and no error prejudicial to plaintiffs 
was commi.:ttedo 
:POINT III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 GIVEN BY THE TR.IAL COURT 
WAS PROPER. 
Appellants quote 't:in part"' I:nstruction 14 in their brief .. 
Since ins~tructions must :Oe viewed as a whole, however, it 
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is. necessary to e.xamine the. entire Instruction and not just 
th.at portion quoted B.y the apl?e.llants. Instruction 14 in 
its entirety· states the following: 
In this case, in addition to denying that 
they were negligent as claimed by the plaintiffs, 
or negligent in any manner whatsoever, the 
defendants have asserted the defense that the 
actions of the driver of the jeep in which the 
plaintiff was riding were an independent, 
intervening proximate cause of the accident, 
and therefore the sole proximate cause of the 
accident and plaintiff•s subsequent injuries. 
'I'o be an independent intervening cause that 
would relieve another's negligence from being 
a proximate cause, it must O.e negligence that 
was not foreseeable. 
In that regard, you are instructed that the 
driver of the jeep, Rodney Talbot, was 
negligent as a matter of law, and if you find 
th.at he observed the bus stopped upon the 
high.way, or, under th.e circumstances should 
have observed the bus, but because of his 
negligence failed to do so in time to 
avoid the accident, then you are instructed 
that the negligence on. hi.? part was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision. 
If you find Talbot did not observe the bus 
in time to avoid it, and it could reasonably 
be anticipated that circumstances may arise 
wherein one may not observe such a dangerous 
condition until too late to escape (i.e., 
reasonably anticipated that an emergency might 
arise) , then his negligence would not be the 
s·ole proximate cause. (R. 2531 . 
Th.us, the instruction correctly covers two types of 
situations: first, whether Talbot had sufficient time to 
observe the bus but failed to do so and, consequently, was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident; second, whether 
Talbot was put into an emergency situation in which he had 
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no time to observe the bus and whether Loosernore should 
have anti.ci~ated that a driver could have been placed 
in a situation where he could not escape. 
The last sentence of Hillyard v. Utah Byproducts 
Company, 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953} cited by the appellants 
in their bri.ef .ts applica.Ble to this distinction: 
The distinction is basically one between a 
situation in which the second actor has 
sufficient time, after Being charged with 
knowledge of the hazard to avoid it, and 
one in which the second actor negligently 
becomes confronted with an emergency 
situation. 263 P.2d at 292. 
It should be noted that except for the last paragraph 
of Instruction No. 14 the instruction was nearly identical 
to that given and approved in McMurdie v~ Underwood, 346 
P .. 2d 711 (Utah 19.59_)_. The instruction in th.at case read 
as follows: 
You are instructed that the driver of the 
pickup truck was negligent as a matter of 
law, and if you find that sh_e observed the 
hazards, if any of the stopped vehicles 
upon the highway or under the circumstances 
should have observed said vehicles, but 
because of her negligence failed to do so in 
time to avoid said accident, then you are 
instructed that the negligence on her part 
was the sole proximate cause of the 
collision ••. Id. at 712. 
The cases of Valasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 366 Po2d 
989- (_Utah 19611, and l\nders·on: v. ;Parsons Red-E-Mix Paving 
Company, 467 P.2d 45 (Utah 19701, also support the proposition 
that a driver who has an unobstructed view of a stopped 
vehicle., fiut who does not exercis-e that view is negligent and 
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is the sole proxim.ate. cause o;f an accident, just as is 
stated i,n para,9ra.I?h- 3 of Instruction No. 14. 
The last paragraph of Ins'truction 14 adopts the 
foreseeability expansion as stated in the Watters case. 
This Court in Watters held that if an emergency situation 
is created where the oncoming driver does not have oppor-
tunity to sufficiently obs-erve tfi.e situation, then the 
question arises as to whether the stopped vehicle driver 
should have been able to foresee that the vehicle 
following would be placed in a perilious situation by 
the actions· of the first vehicle .. 
The final paragraph. of Instruction 14 clearly allows 
the jury to consider whether or not such a situation existed 
and wheth.er the. bus driver should have foreseen a dangerous 
situation being created by his stop. 
The recent case of Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, No. 16417 (Utah, April 15, 1980}, 
also supports this instruction. In that case it was held 
that the question of proximate cause and foreseeability must 
be decided by a factfinder even if it is assumed that 
negligence is established as a matter of law. The second 
paragraph of Instruction 14 and the fourth paragraph of 
Instruction 14 clearly adopt the foreseeability standard 
and allow the jury to weigh whether or not the bus driver 
could have. foreseen the actions taken by the jeep driver. 
There was ample evidence presented to the jury for it 
to conclude that the jeep driver ~ 
~ 
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to observe the bus in front of him, but simply £ailed to 
do so. 'l'he evidence. sh.owed th.at no '·"emergency situation'" 
existe.d and that Loosemore could not have reasonably 
foreseen that a vehicle traveling in b.ack oe the bus 
at a distance of many hundred feet would not see a large 
bus parked to the side of the road in broad daylight and 
be able to pass it with. 1-1/2 sou~thbound lanes available. 
For these reasons, Instruction 14 was a correct state-
ment of current Utah. law and was not erroneous. 
POI·NT IV. 
THE JUR~ INSTRUCTIONS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, WERE 
NOT IMPROPER OR INCOMPLETE·, AND DID NOT 
OVEREMPHASI-ZE DEFENDANTS• THEORY OF THE CASEe 
Plaintiffs make numerous complaints concerning the 
remaining jury instructions., (Appellants• brief, pp. 15-16). 
These arguments toe are groundles·s. 
Plaintiffs complain that the lower court erred in failing 
to instruct the jury that the negligence of Talbot could 
not be i_mpute.d to plaintiff Matthew H:arris and in failing to 
instruct the jury that Matthew Harris was himself not neg-
ligent e Since defendants did not claim that HarriS' was 
negligent or claim that the negligence of Talbot should be 
attributed to Harris, such an instructio_n would only have 
confused the jury. 
A court is not required to instruct a jury on questions 
and issues which are not presented in the lawsuit. This 
Court has held that J;lO instruction should be. given unless 
-27-
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it is both necessa,ry and applica.b.le to the fact situation 
involved in the cg.s:e_.. ~dley v~ woo<)__,. 345 P. 2d 19.7 (Utah 
19.591. In ~act,. it is error to instruct on legal propositiom 
that are_ not within th_e issues- of the case and on which there 
is no evidence presented. ~yder v. Sandlin, 374 P.2d 133 
{J~. M. 1962)_. 
Plaintiffs-further complain that their theory of the 
case wa,s not presented By the lower court since their 
Instruction No. 1 was not given whereas they claim 
Instruction No. 14 stated defendants t theory of the case. 
A comparison of these ins-tructions, however, does not support 
this contention. Plaintiffs l Requested Instruction No. 1 is 
an elaborate recitation of the facts similar to that given 
by counsel in his opening argument to the jury. Instruction 
No. 14, on the other hand, merely explains and defines the 
elements necessary- for an independent, intervening proximate 
cause .. 
The fact that the first paragraph to Instruction 14 makes 
refere:nae to defendants' •tasserted defense'" hardly makes 
the Instruction a "theory of the case." The_ jury was entitled 
and had to know the elements of intervening proximate cause 
in order to understand all of the issues and defenses raised 
by the parties. However / the. jury did not need to know the 
alleged factual occurrences claimed by plaintiffs in the form 
of a jury instruction. I 
Next, plaintiffs complain that proposed Instruction No. 201 
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was not given which would have told the jury to draw no 
inference. trom the ;fact that Talbot was not a party in the 
proceeding.. This, like the first complaints of plaintiffs, 
was an irrelevant instruction request since. there was 
never any claim :O.y defendants that Talbot should have been 
a party to the lawsuit or that his· presence had any effect 
upon the negligence of the plaintiffs. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that, oecause witnesses 
testified that a second southbound lane was unobstructed, 
an instruction should have been given stating that such 
unobstructed lane. did not lessen Loosemore' s duty to pull 
off the road. Again, tfiere was no claim by defendants that 
the existence of a free lane of traffic lessened Loosemore's 
duty pursuant to the Utah statute or that the existence of 
the other 1 ane made pulling over to the curb 'timpractical o" 
The existence of the southbound lane, however, was 
pertinent in establishing the conduct of Talbot as to whether 
he had an opportunity both_ to observe the bus and to avoid 
itG Plaintiffst speculation that the jury could interpret 
the other southbound lane to negate the effect of the 
statutory parking requirement does not rise to the level of 
a valid objection. 
The instructions given to the jury were fair, complete, 
and not misleadi~g~. No error was made in either the giving 
of the Court •·s ins.tructions Ol: .i::_n the omission of the 
instructions offe.re.d by plai.nttf f s -
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·;e~IN'l' VI. 
';[;'HE COURT DI:D NOT ERR IN. EXCLUDI}fG PLAINTI;F~s-•· 
EXHIBI.'l1S N.~. 42 ;\ND 4 3" 
:,Plaintif.fs· claim that the lowe.r court erred in excluding 
Exhibits 42 and 43 which consiste.d of maintenance records 
of the bus subsequent to the accident. Such a proposition 
is unsupporta:Ole. I't s·hould be noted at the outset that 
the trial court allowed Exhibits 40 and 41 into evidence. 
These· exhibits were an itemized listing of all of the defects 
and electrical defe.cts· reported on the bus from 1975 until 
the date of the accident. (Tr. 219 I . Mr. Daniel L. 
Newland, UTA' s shop foreman, was· extensively examined by 
plaintiffst counsel as to the alleged defects existing in t~ 1 bus prior to the accident. (Tr. 695.,,..,696) • 
The trial court ;refused to admit Exhibits 42 and 43, 
however, for several reasons. First, the proposed exhibits 
did not show re.pair o~ the rear lights per se, but concern 
all of the electrical system of the bus including the 
speedometer, dimmer swi tcfi.es, headlights and electric doors. 
The exhibita,.. themselves, therefore, do not go to the specifi 
condition of the rear lights but contain extraneous informati 
which could only prejudice the defendants by allowing the ju 
to conclude that the bus was in general disrepair. 
Second, th.ere was no evidence shown that any subsequent 
defects in the electrical system of the bus was not caused 
by the accident itself. The collision with Talbot required 
the "wiring up of new lights'" as shown in Exhibit 43. (Tr. 
710). Defendants put in evidence 
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showed that it was necessary to replace the le;Et side 
electrical sX"stem of the h.us .;i,ncluding the bulbs, the 
retlectors, a,nd. the ?anel. (Tr. 1ag1. 
Finally, Utah law is well-settled that subsequent 
repairs cannot :Ce used to establish that a former condition 
was unsafe or was negli.gently maintained. Potter v. Dr. 
W. H. Groves Latter-day Saints: Hospital, 103 P. 2d 280 (Utah 
1940). In spite of plaintiffs• contentions, the proposed 
exhibits could not be used to establish a prior condition 
since the collision itself damaged the electrical system 
making it irrelevant as to subsequent repairs. 
This Court has stated on numerous occasions that a trial 
court is gi:ven considerable discretion in deciding whether 
or not evidence· submitted is relevant. Lambrough v. Bethers, 
552 Po2d 1286 (Utah 1976). Even if the ~-evidence was wrong-
fully excluded, that fact alone is insufficient to satisfy 
a verdict unles·s it has "a s·ubstantial influence in bringing 
about the verdict.••· Rule 4b, Rules of Evidence, Utah 1971. 
In this case the trial court was jus·tified in refusing 
to admit the subsequent repairs of the bus for the reasons 
stated. No error was committed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial of this matter consumed four days of court 
hearings, involved 19 witnesses, and introduced over 50 exhibits. 
The legal issues now before this Court were carefully briefed 
by both parties during the trial and the lower court heard 
extensive arguments setting forth both positions. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The jury returned a verdict finding no ~e-gligence on the 
part of defendants. There was substantial evidence to 
support this verdict and, in fact, plaintiffs do not contest 
the evidence supporting the jury verdict. 
Rather, plaintiffs maintain that the court committed 
prejudicial error in instructing the jury that the jeep 
driver was negligent as a matter of law. The evidence 
shows, however, that reasonable minds could not differ 
that Rodney Talbot was in fact negligent. The evidence 
was uncontroverted that Talbot had an unobstructed view 
of the bus, that-the road conditions were good, but that 
he simply did not see the. bus because of inattention on 
his part. 
This is not a case, as claimed by plaintiffs, where one 
driver is following another driver who suddenly stops, 
thereby causing the second driver to collide. Here, the 
evidence is clear that the bus had pulled over onto the 
shoulder of the road in a smooth normal stop and was loading 
the passenger for a minimum of at least one second and 
a maximum of over 10 seconds before the collision occurred. 
Talbot- himself - admitted that he never saw the bus until 
a split second before he hit it, thereby negating any claim 
of negligence as to the location of the bus or as to its 
~unctioning tail lights. 
Again, it should be remembered that only the issue of 
negligence of Talbot was directed by the court and not the 
question of proximate cause which-i..s_ the ultimate issue 
-.._._i-_ l,- ,, '-~ I ', 
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in cases such as this. 'l'he jury, in spite of the court's 
direction, still could h.ave concluded that the negligence 
of the defendants was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. 
Talbot was clearly negligent as a matter of law. 
Loosemore, on the other hand, was negligent only if he 
violated the parking statute, only if the violation of 
such statute was unreasonable, only if his lights were. 
not functioning :properly, and only if he maintained an 
improper lookout. Unlike the case of Talbot, Loosemore's 
claimed negligence could only Be determined by evaluating 
the disputed evidence presented by both sides. 
For these reasons, the Court properly submitted the 
question of Talbot,. s causation, and Loosemore "s negligence 
and causation to the jury for its determinationo 
Likewise, rnstruction 14 was completely proper in that 
it correctly incorporated the s.tartdard of Hillyard v. 
Utah Byproducts as modified by Watters v. Q·uerry .. 
Plaintiffst other complaints concerning giving or 
faili.."lg to give instructions are equally w-i thout merit. 
A lower court has no obligation to instruct the jury 
on mere "possibilitiesn· speculated UJ?On by the I?laintiffs. 
The instructions, as a whole, were ~a~r and complete. 
Finally·,. the lowe.r court did not erl:' in ,::-efusing to 
admit the. subseguent repair records of the nus since such 
records did not refer specifically to the rear lights of the 
-33-
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bus, the. da,mages could have be.en caused by the accident 
itself, and the re.cords: could only be shown for the purpose 
of establishing negligence which is contrary to existing 
Utah law. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the jury verdict 
should be. affirmed .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondent 
MA!LING CER,'l'IFICATE 
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the 
foregoing Respondents' Brief upon appellants by 
mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Merlin Lybbert, 
700 Continental Bank Building, City, Utah 
8410.1, this L8_ day- o~ 
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